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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Commission of Ohm' The Cincinnati Gas Company and the City of
Cincinnati challenged the validity of the ninth of a series of emergency or-
ders issued by the Public Utilities Commisson of Ohio prohibiting the ad-
dition of space heating customers. Such a "freeze" order had previously
been upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Akron v. Public
Utilites Comrmssion of Ohio,2 but the question of unlawful delegation of
legislative power had not been considered in that case.
In affirming the action of the Commission, the court found that such an
emergency order was within the power of the Public Utilities Commission in
protecting the health, safety and welfare of the public. The court held that
there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power to the public utility
because the obligation imposed upon the utility company to police such an
order was merely a ministerial duty. The discretion reposed in the utility
company by the rule merely required the company to discontinue service to




Holmnan v. Smithi sustained, as between the grantor and the grantee's
successor, a deed that was delivered before, but acknowledged after the
death of the grantee. The grantee had received equitable title prior to her
death. In Ohio acknowledgment of a deed is not merely a prerequisite to
recording as in many states, 2 but is essential to pass legal tile.3 It is doubt-
ful whether the court in this case would have sustained the deed if equitable
title had not passed to the grantee prior to her death.
Vesy v. Giles states that consideration is not necessary to validate a
deed. This statement is very probably the law in Ohio5 and other states6
but it is weakened by the fact that there was a recital of consideration in
the deed. This recital the court considered superfluous.
'157 Ohio St. 574, 106 N.E.2d 642 (1952).
2 149 Ohio St. 347, 78 N.E.2d 890 (1948).
1102 N.E.2d 483 (Ohio App.), appeal distmined, 156 Ohio St. 227, 101 N.E.2d
730 (1951).
23 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.60 (1952); PATrON, TITLES § 179 (1938).
3Owo GEN. CODE § 8510.
' 108 N.E.2d 300 (Geauga Corn. P1. 1952).
"See Brown v. Whaley, 58 Ohio St. 654, 665, 49 N.E. 479, 480 (1898); Thomp-
son v. Thompson, 17 Ohio St. 649, 655 (1867)
a3 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.43 (1952).
[spring
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The Supreme Court of Ohio in McMechan v. Board of Eduocatton7 con-
strued strictly the Act of 18608 which conferred on township boards of edu-
canon the power of eminent domain to procure schoolhouse sites. The court
held that the failure of the Act to authorize the taking of a fee sinple title
gave township boards of education only the power to acquire the "use" of
property for schoolhouse sites. Although the acquisition of an easement to
use land as a schoolhouse site is unusual, the court apparently meant that
when the board of education acquired the "use" of the land for school pur-
poses it obtained only an easement in fee sunple determinable ("condi-
tional fee").
Two of the cases cited by the court in support of its opimon in the
McMechan case might have been cited to support an opposite decision.
One of these cases, Malone v. Toledo,9 held that the Act, authorizing the
state to acquire the "fee simple" of land needed for a canal, authorized the
taking of the fee simple absolute title and not the fee simple determinable
title. Strict construction in the Malone case would have limited the power
of the state to the acquisition of the fee simple determinable tile. The
court in the Malone case took into consideration the fact that the state owned
in fee simple absolute land acquired by gift or voluntary purchase for canal
purposes and therefore would obviously wish to own in fee simple absolute
all land used for canal purposes. Likewise, the township boards of educa-
tion undoubtedly owned in fee simple absolute land acquired by gift or
voluntary purchase.
In the other case, Henry v. Columbus Depot Co. ° cited as authority for
the majority opinion in the McMechan case, the court quoted with approval
this statement from Ruling Case Law: " it is well settled that when land
is taken for the public use, unless the fee is necessary for the purposes for
which the land is taken, as for example when land is taken for a schoolhouse
or the statute expressly provides that the fee shall be taken, the public
acquires only an easement" 1 [Italics added].
Concurrent Ownership
The court of appeals held in Cohen v. Cohen1 2 that a tenant in common
who alone occupies a jointly owned house does not have to account to her
co-tenants. The court of appeals arrived at this conclusion by using the
income tax definition of profits to construe the ancient phrase "rents and
S157 Ohio St. 241, 105 N.E.2d 270 (1952).
'57 Omo LAws 9 (1860).
'34 Ohio St 541 (1878).
135 Ohio St 311, 20 N.E.2d 921 (1939).
"10 R.C.L 89.
189 Ohio APP. 389, 102 N.E.2d 712 (1951).
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profits" used in Ohio General Code Section 12046. The supreme court,
however, reversed the decision and required the occupying tenant to ac-
count to her co-tenants for their share of the "rents and profits" received
from occupancy. 13
Although personal property was involved in In re Reiner's EstateU the
court's decision may affect real property law as well. The probate court
added a little more confusion to property law by stating that upon the
death of one joint tenant his interest "descends" to the surviving tenant.
The generally accepted explanation of survivorship in a joint tenancy is
that each joint tenant owns the whole and on the death of either joint
tenant his interest simply ceases. The surviving joint tenant continues to
own the whole."5 The court in this case also said that most states have
abolished joint tenancy. The court probably meant to say that the presump-
tion in favor of joint tenancy has been abolished in most states as to gran-
tees who are not fiduciaries.' 6
The phrase "joint tenancy" as used in opinions of Ohio courts may refer
to (1) tenancy in common for life with contingent remainders, or (2) ten-
ancy in common in fee simple with executory interests or (3) contractual
relationship. 17
When is a tenant in common entitled to partition under Ohio General
Code Section 12026? Section 12026 simply states: 'Tenants in common
of any estate in lands may be compelled to make or suffer parti-
tion. " An early Ohio Supreme Court case, Tabler v. lViseman,'8 had
construed the phrase "tenants in common" as used in this section to mean
only tenants in common in possessin or who have the immediate right to
possession. The court held that a reversioner or remainderman after a life
estate is not entitled to partition under Section 12026. In Rawson v.
Browni9 the Ohio Supreme Court had recognized the right of a tenant in
common of a fee simple subject to a renewable ninety-nine year lease ("per-
petual lease") to maintain an action of partition because the possession of
the lessee was the possession of the lessors.
Last year a common pleas court in Foppe v. Foppe20 refused to allow a
tenant in common of a fee simple subject to an estate for one year to bring
'Cohen v. Cohen, 157 Ohio St. 503, 106 N.E.2d 77 (1952).
' 106 N.E.2d 94 (Hamilton Probate Ct. 1952)
"3 AM. LAw OF PROPERTY § 14.17 (1952).
182 AM. LAw OF PRoPERTY § 6.3 (1952).
'Note, Survworship Deeds m Ohio, 3 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 60 (1951).
"2 Ohio St. 208 (1853); accord, Eberle v. Gaier, 89 Ohio St. 118, 105 N.E. 282
(1913).
104 Ohio St. 537, 136 N.E. 209 (1922).
"103 N.E.2d 319 (Hamilton Com. Pl. 1951).
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an action for partition because the tenant in common did not have posses-
sion. The holding in the Foppe case is contrary to the decisions that tenants
in common who have the seisin are considered in law to be in possession of
the land within the meaning of statutes similar to Section 12026.21 The
fact that the owner of the estate for one year in the Foppe case did not pay
rent, whereas the owner of the "perpetual lease" in the Rawson case paid rent,
is inmaterial if seisin in the tenant in common is the important factor in
these partition cases.
Registered Title
Prior to August 18, 1937, assessments for local improvements were liens
on land registered under the Torrens Act only if a notice of the assessment
was filed with the county recorder in accordance with Ohio General Code
Section 8572-56. The City of South Euclid neglected to comply with this
section of the Torrens Act. In 1937 and 1940 the City of South Euclid
respread by reassessment the earlier assessments. No notice of these reas-
sessments was filed with the county recorder. The City of South Euclid at-
tempted to enforce these reassessments against persons who purchased
registered land at forfeited land sales. The Supreme Court of Ohio held in
Gunderson v. South Euclid22 that these earlier assessments were not liens
prior to 1937 and were not made liens by the reassessments after 1937
Adverse Possession
Does possession cease to be adverse when the adverse possessor orally
agrees to hold under the true owner and to pay rent? The court of appeals
in Manos v'. Day Cleaners & Dyers8 held that the oral lease did not stop
the running of the statute of limitations because the true owner never lost
his right to eject the adverse possessor. This decision is subject to crit-
cism because a tenancy at will can be created orally. A tenant at will is not
an adverse possessor. Also, a tenancy at will deprives the owner of his right
to hold the tenant liable as a trespasser.
Easements
Two recent supreme court cases upheld the right of an owner of property
that abuts on a public street to an easement of access to the street. McKay v.
Kauer4 recognized the right of an owner to compensation for damage
to his property caused by lowering the grade of the abutting street. North-
ern Boiler Co. v. David25 declared invalid an ordinance that allowed a single
: 1 AM. LAW OF PRoPERTY § 4.94 (1952).
" 157 Ohio St. 437, 105 N.E.2d 863 (1952).
91 Ohio App. 361, 108 N.E.2d 347 (1952).
156 Ohio St. 347, 108 N.E.2d 703 (1951).
Z 157 Ohio St. 564, 106 N.E.2d 620 (1952).
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